RE-EXAMINING HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTIONS IN ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH: UNPACKING THE MEMES OF OVER-ZEALOUS OVERSIGHT


                              Jim Thomas
                       Department of Sociology
                     Northern Illinois University
                          DeKalb, IL (60115)
                       jthomas@sun.soci.niu.edu
                            30 March, 2002
 

_______________
DRAFT:  Prepared for the Midwest Sociological Society annual meetings,
Milwaukee, April 7, 2002.

I am indebted to Lori Bross, Herbert Rubin, Irene Rubin,  and various
colleagues at NIU and elsewhere for providing insights and information
that shape the suggestions.  The  position here does not necessarily
reflect their own  views,  but their positions  were instrumental in
shaping my own.
                               ABSTRACT
 
     Like it or not, a new age of "ethical responsibility" has emerged
(Thomas,  2001).   Institutional watchdogs  and moral entrepreneurs
continually remind us,  and often require,  that we demonstrate prior
to,  during,  and after,  that our research conforms to established
ethical codes.   Especially for social science and cultural research,
this has precipitated  an adversarial and often  hostile relationship
between scholars and watchdogs, especially institutional review boards
(IRBs).
 
     In this paper,  I try to balance a critique of IRB practices with
sympathetic suggestions  for changing  them as  an antidote  to the
growing pathology  of opposition  dividing IRBs  from the  research
community.   In identifying selected memes,  or cultural replicators,
that fuel this distance,  I argue that human subjects protections risk
being reified by  apparent moral entrepreneurs who  advocate drafting
explicit and  immutable prescriptions  and proscriptions  for human
subjects research.   I  argue that we need not invent  new rules for
protecting human subjects or reduce protections to an immutable set of
prescriptions and proscriptions.   I conclude  by suggesting ways by
which IRBs can attend to meme-management as a way of reducing distance
from, and animosity to, qualitative social scientists.
 
 
 
 
  RE-EXAMINING HUMAN SUBJECTS PROTECTIONS IN ETHNOGRAPHIC RESEARCH:
            UNPACKING THE MEMES OF OVER-ZEALOUS OVERSIGHT
 
     When thinking of research involving human subjects, we rarely pay
attention to their  protection until something goes  horribly wrong.
Then,  we are challenged for an  accounting.   In response to highly
publicized and sometimes  dramatic lapses in scholarship  in the past
decade,  increased oversight by peers  and institutions,  and recent
Federal policies and regulations, have made research ethics a priority
at all research-oriented institutions.   Like it or not, a new age of
"ethical responsibility" has emerged (Thomas,  2001).   Institutional
watchdogs and moral entrepreneurs continually  remind us,  and often
require, that we demonstrate prior to, during,  and after,  that our
research conforms to established ethical codes.  Especially for social
science and cultural research,  this  has precipitated an adversarial
and  often hostile  relationship between  scholars and  watchdogs,
especially institutional review boards (IRBs).
 
     In this paper,  I try to balance a critique of IRB practices with
sympathetic suggestions  for changing  them as  an antidote  to the
growing pathology  of opposition  dividing IRBs  from the  research
community.   In identifying selected memes,  or cultural replicators,
that fuel this distance,  I argue that human subjects protections risk
being reified by  apparent moral entrepreneurs who  advocate drafting
explicit  and immutable  prescriptions and  proscriptions for  Net
research.   I argue that we need  not invent new rules for protection
human  subjects or  reduce  protections to  an  immutable set  of
prescriptions and proscriptions.   I conclude  by suggesting ways by
which IRBs can attend to meme-management as a way of reducing distance
from, and animosity by, qualitative social scientists.

                              Who Cares?
 
     Why  should social  scientists take  an  aggressive stand  in
supporting recent  Federal guidelines  for educating  researchers on
human subjects protections?   One reason is that it's nicer to be nice
than not nice.   Another is that, as methodologists, teachers, journal
editors, reviewers, commentators,  and policy makers,  we continue to
confront occasional human subjects dilemmas  in our respective fields.
Consider a few dramatic examples from qualitative research.
 
     When Humphries (1970)  published Tea Room Trade over two decades
ago,  he  drew unprecedented criticism  from social  scientists for
perceived ethical flaws  in his study of gay  culture and lifestyles.
He  lingered in  truckstop restrooms  and watched  for gay  sexual
activity,  on occasion even serving as "lookout" for the participants,
and then surreptitiously recorded their  automobile license numbers to
identify them  for subsequent follow-up interviews.    Joe Kotarba's
(1979)  study of intimacy in a public jail visiting room drew shrilly
misguided and somewhat paralogical  criticism for questionable ethics
(Deegan, 1980).   The dramatic Carnegie Mellon cyber-culture study of
online pornography (Rimm,  1995),  later featured as a cover story in
Time magazine (Elmer-Dewit,  1995),  came under fire for gross human
subjects violations when it was revealed  that ten different levels of
gatekeepers--professionals who should have spotted the lapses--ignored
them (Thomas, 1996a).   Mario Brajuha was jailed for refusing to give
his fieldnotes to police when  subpoenaed following a suspicious fire
in the restaurant where he collected his data, because he had promised
his subjects anonymity (Brajuha and Hallowell, 1986).  His experience
challenged other  social scientists to  examine their  commitment to
protect their  subjects.  It is in  this challenging spirit  that I
explore some  of the  issues underlying attempts  to engage  in and
monitor the ethics of human-subjects research.
 
     There are  number of reasons,   some ethical,  others  in our
self-interest, why scholars should take aggressive measures to protect
human subjects.   Any alone provides sufficient grounds,  but in the
aggregate,  they are  a compelling reason to  support professional,
Federal, and institutional oversight initiatives.
 
     First, ethical behavior, including human subjects protection,  is
inherent in, and essential to, scholarship.   Second,  awareness and
practices of  protecting human subjects  enhance the  credibility of
research and  contribute to  a climate of  trust and  integrity in
establishing rapport with subjects.   A single egregious violation by
one researcher poisons  the credibility of others  as well.   Third,
members of the academic community, even those not directly involved in
research,   identify and  reaffirm the  principles of  responsible
scholarship in manuscript review, teaching,  advising,  and collegial
discussions.   Awareness of potential problems  raises red flags that
enable peers to pro-actively screen for potential problems.   Fourth,
promoting ethical  standards complies with Federal  and institutional
requirements and helps ensure a positive professional image internally
and externally.
 
 
     Fifth, promoting human subjects protections increases familiarity
with potential issues in one's one field  as well as in other fields,
illustrating the  complexity of seemingly simple  potential problems.
Such cross-fertilization helps to bind researchers across disciplines,
such as oral history, sociology, business,  anthropology,  education,
and nursuing.   Sixth, promoting human subjects protections creates an
awareness of  the rationale that  guides identifying  and resolving
problems.   As Marquart and Thomas  (1988)  and Bakker (2001)  have
argued,  formal ethical  rules or the ethical  codes of professional
organizations  are not  always  helpful,   and sometimes  sharing
principles,  instead of rigid precepts,  helps resolve some problems.
Seventh, ethical awareness increases recognition of the investigator's
own location in the process of  scholarship and our obligations to the
public served by our scholarship.    Sometimes,  the researcher owes
conflicting allegiances to subjects (Marquart and Thomas, 1988), which
requires us to identify where our ethical loyalties lie and who we are
bound to protect.   Eighth, an awareness of ethical issues contributes
to shared awareness of the diversity  and complexity of issues facing
practitioners involved in human subjects  research,  and promotes an
environment of collegial recognition and discussion.

             Protection of Human Subjects: Enter the IRB
 
     Human subjects are protected in many ways,  such as researchers'
and professional codes of ethics and conventional research norms.  The
most formal and rigorous method is by IRBs.  IRBs are mandated for all
institutions receiving Federal funds (Title 45 CRF, Part 46)  and are
intended to  protect the rights  and well-being of  human subjects,
especially in biomedical and behavior research.   Institutional review
boards emerged out of Federal research guidelines begun in 1947 and in
1974 formalized  in 45 CFR 46.   They provide the  broad guidelines
established by the Federal government to  protect the welfare of human
research subjects.   In 2000,  President Clinton directed all Federal
agencies to review their IRB  procedures,  including an assessment of
the degree of  compliance by research institutions  receiving Federal
research funding.   By statute,  IRBs are comprised of institutional
personnel,  but function  as a proxy for the  Federal government in
attaining institutional compliance with Federal regulations.
 
     The hybrid mix of interests and  missions of IRBs contributes to
their often confusing policies and practices.   Their location between
the Federal government and their institutions  is best understood as a
type of franchise,   in some ways similar to  a McDonald's hamburger
chain.   Like individual McDonald's franchises, which ostensibly serve
their communities  while accountable  to corporate  headquarters for
profits, service,  and other operations,  IRBs are located within and
staffed by the academic community  in their institutions.   Although
universities appoint  IRB members,  provide resources,   and create
guidelines for attaining IRB consent,   like a franchise,  they are
exempt from normal "community" accountability.   Section 46.104 of 45
CFR 46  specifies that an  institution engaging in  research "shall"
provide satisfactory written  assurance that it will  comply with the
Federal requirements of  45 CFR 46.   The  regulation's assurance is
evaluated by the  Office of Human Research  Protections (OHRP),  an
office within the Department of Health  and Human Services,  that can
"approve,  disapprove,  or  enter into negotiations to  develop an
approvable one."  In situations at the University of Illinois/Chicago,
Duke University, Rush Hospital (Chicago), and Johns Hopkins University
that made the news in recent years for non-compliance, the OHRP halted
their  research,  presumably  by  suspending their  institutional
Assurances.   In other words,  they revoked their "franchise" not for
failing to protect human subjects,  but for failing to follow Federal
rules.
 
     IRBs review all proposals to  first determine whether a scholarly
activity involves research,  and second,   whether it involves human
subjects.  If  the answer to both  is affirmative,  the  IRB then
determines the  extent to  which protections  of subjects  must be
detailed by the  researcher to comply with  Federal and institutional
guidelines.    Especially  since President  Clinton's  directive,
universities across  the country  have rigorously  and aggressively
expanded their procedures and scope of oversight. IRBs generally break
applications for research approval into three categories.  The first,
exempt status, refers to proposals that are judged to possess minimal,
if any, risk to human subjects, as defined by Federal guidelines.   If
exempt, proposals need not be reviewed further by the IRB.   Contrary
to some  misconceptions,  "exempt status"  does not mean  that such
research need not be submitted to the IRB,  but rather that it must be
submitted to the IRB, which then makes the exempt determination.   The
second category of applications are those  that,  while they may pose
minimal risk, nonetheless should be given closer scrutiny.   Third are
proposals in which the research  methodology may pose sufficient risk
to human subjects such that a full IRB review is required.   The third
category generates  the most  controversy,  because  IRBs may  ask
well-meaning questions out of ignorance, fear, cautious expediency, or
ideological opposition in  assuring that the research  complies with
existing policies.
 
     The most  egregious and  dramatic recent  violations of  human
subjects research have come from the medical sciences, typified by the
University of Minnesota paying the U.S.  $32 million in the late 1990s
to settle  a lawsuit  alleging over  two decades  of illegal  drug
profiteering and mishandling of grant  funds (cite);  allegations of
violations of informed consent policies in  the Virginia Twin Study in
1998 that  shut down  all Federally-funded  biomedical research  at
Virginal Commonwealth  University;  and  the suspension  of medical
research in 1999  at the University of  Illinois/Chicago for alleged
improprieties of human subjects protection.
 
     Yet, the definition of human subjects is broad.   Consistent with
guidelines of other professional organizations (Thomas,  1996b),  the
definition from Title 45 CFR Part 46,  "Protection Of Human Subjects"
defines a human subject as:

     ...a living individual about whom an investigator (whether
        professional or student) conducting research obtains
        (1) data through intervention or interaction with the
            individual,
        (2) identifiable private information."
 
     While  Federal guidelines  generally connote  an intention  of
protecting human  subjects primarily  in biomedical  and behavioral
research, the definition has been intepreted to also include observees
and conversational partners in less  intrusive research as well.   As
the examples of controversial research summarized above indicate,  the
necessity  of  protecting  human subjects  in  all  research  is
indisputable.   The controversy lies not so much in the laudable goals
intended to protect people,  but rather in the means to implement them
and  how the  means risk  encroaching upon  academic freedom  and
unrestricted inquiry.

                         Memes and Idiopathy
 
     The  images  generated by  researchers'  stories  describing
frustrating experiences  with IRBs create  memes,  or  the cultural
replicators by which we create and maintain cultural meanings:

     Just as  genes propagate themselves  in the gene  pool by
     leaping from body  to body via sperms or  eggs,  so memes
     propagate themselves in the meme  pool by leaping from brain
     to brain via a process which,  in the broad sense,  can be
     called imitation (Dawkins, 1976: 206).
 
     Examples of memes include tunes, ideas, clothes, or fashion.   In
the case of IRBs, the circulation and acceptance creates and reaffirms
pejorative labels that demonize IRBs as the narratives that shape them
are announced,  accepted,  circulated,  and perhaps even embellished
through iterative tellings.  The original narratives need not actually
be accurate.  They need only  be announced,  iteratively circulated,
accepted as accurate.   This creates image-management problems for the
IRB.
 
     It's hardly a secret that IRBs have a bad image. They are seen by
many scholars  as a genetic  mutation of the  doctrinal purification
rituals of  the Spanish Inquisition  conducted by Joe  McCarthys in
leisure  suits and  primitive barbarians  subverting the  ages-long
doctrines of free inquiry.   While the criticisms may be unfair, they
are perpetuated at  least in part by the continued  distance that the
IRBs create between  themselves and the research  constituencies they
ostensibly serve.   This adversarial relationship can be attributed in
part to a form of idiopathy, a disease of the IRBs own making.   Among
the many memes the IRB has generated, four stand out:   Idiosyncrasy,
idiocity, idolatry, and ideopraxis.  The following examples are drawn
from colleagues' reports across the country.

Idiosyncrasy.
 
     Idiosyncrasy refers to the particularistic  behaviors or views of
individuals or  groups that depart  from conventional  standards or
norms.   For IRBs, this refers to the discretionary interpretations of
the Federal  or institutional guidelines  that ostensibly  guide the
procedures and  outcomes of  IRB decision  making.  This  includes
misguided or  questionable interpretations  of policy  and replacing
existing guidelines with personal preferences.  For example,  an IRB
member might depart from existing policies  that would waive the need
for signed consent form of persons  who provide data for research and
instead require that signed consent  forms are required whenever data
is collected from individuals,  regardless  how unfeasible such forms
might be.  As an illustration,  one IRB board vehemently opposed the
covert study  of drug dealers by  a participant observer  because it
seemed unethical  to be  involved in  even indirect  observation of
illegal activities on such a "hot-button" topic.  Here, the issue was
not one of protecting human subjects,   or even the reputation of the
university, but rather the imposition of IRB members' personal ethical
views in ways that restrict inquiry.    The result is that IRBs shift
from being a protector of human  subjects to gatekeeper of acceptable
research ethics.

Idiocy.
 
     Sometimes, the concerns and requirements of IRB boards -- however
well-meaning they  may be  -- seem foolish  and exceed  what,  to
researchers, appear reasonable. This may often be attributed to a lack
of IRB  understanding of  the nature  of research,   especially in
fieldwork.
 
     As an example,  a nationally  respected and experienced scholar
submitted a  proposed study of  women in  jails to her  IRB.  The
population being studied, largely Hispanic,  was to be interviewed in
English,  the fieldnotes taken in English,  and the analysis done in
English.   Yet,  the IRB inexplicably insisted that the fieldnotes be
transcribed into Spanish,  even though  the transcripts would not be
automatically shared with the interviewees.   The problems of faulty
translations  and the  unnecessary additional  time  and costs  of
transcriptions aside, there was no reasonable justification for such a
requirement.  Although  the issue was resolved  satisfactorily,  it
exemplifies the type of intrusion and increased stress for researchers
that escalate the animosity between scholars and IRBs.
 
     In another case,  a scholar wanted to  engage in a study with a
methodology that included auto-ethnography,   which refers to drawing
from the researcher's own life,  using herself as the "human subject"
from whom data are drawn.   According to the researcher's account, the
IRB suggested that she actually needed  IRB approval to study herself.
The Board's argument was that,  while it might appear silly,  Federal
regulations were silent on, and made no exemption for,  self-analysis.
Therefore,  it  would be  best to obtain  IRB approval  to assure
compliance.  Reportedly,  wiser heads prevailed,  and the issue was
dropped.  Yet, such stories drive scholars' fears that IRB actions are
unreasonable, even capricious, thus reinforcing the meme of idiocy.

Idolatry.
 
     Idolatry, an excessive devotion to mythic symbols,  characterizes
IRBs in the eyes of some scholars. This can take many forms, including
seeming excesses  in attempting to  identify even the  most extreme
scenario that  could put a subject  at risk.   This can  range from
slavish adherence to  the letter of Federal and  other guidelines to
extreme protection of subjects in improbable research scenarios.
 
     As an example, a researcher at one institution was faced with the
dilemma of addressing  the issue of informing prisoners  from whom he
might collect data through conversations  or by simply observing them
that he must explain to the  prisoners that sharing information would
not affect the  parole board's decision to  release them.   Federal
regulations,  as  written,  appeared to require  this.   However,
implementation by the researcher  seemed inapplicable,  because this
state no longer uses parole to  release prisoners,  other than for an
insignificant number sentenced prior to 1978. While some minimal forms
of administrative discretion might affect some prisoners, parole isn't
a significant mechanism. In reality, this example is a unfair, because
the IRB did not itself formally raise the issue.   As a courtesy, the
researcher was informed of the rule  prior to submitting his proposal
to allow the researcher to address the Federal policy.   This example
illustrates the shared dilemma for both  the IRB and scholars:   The
Federal  emphasis on  human  subjects  protections requires  full
compliance, and in case of a Federal audit,  both researchers and IRBs
must demonstrate that they scrupulously complied with the rules.

Ideopraxis
 
     IRBs function as ideopraxists, or people assigned to carry out an
idea.  Prior to 2000, IRBs generally limited their scope to the spirit
of human protections.   Since then, they have been mandated to impose
Federal principles  and policies on  the research  community.   Two
examples illustrate how this has occurred and the impact it has had on
scholars.
 
     First,  IRBs have dramatically expanded the rigorousness of their
examination of  human subjects  research.  This  has created  the
perception that oversight is characterized  by memes of idiosyncrasy,
idiocy,  and idolatry.  In the  examples above,  the questions were
motivated  by  well-meaning  people  who  take  their  oversight
responsibilities seriously. But, Federal guidelines have escalated the
scrutiny of research procedures,  and the expansion of the definition
of human subjects provides one example.
 
     Some institutions  believe that data  derived from  any living
person requires IRB approval.   While often just an unfortunate choice
of loose wording,  this nonetheless  motivates the wrath of scholars
doing auto-ethnography or who observe people in situations where there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy.  Observing people in a public
setting in which there is no interaction or intervention, and in which
no identifiable private information is collected or reported,  simply
does not  fall within the  Federal definition of  "human subjects."
Recall the definition from 45 CFR 46:

     (f)  _Human Subject_ means a living individual about whom an
     investigator (whether professional  or student)  conducting
     research obtains
        (1) data through intervention or interaction with the
            individual, or
        (2) identifiable private information....INTERACTION
            includes communication or interpersonal contact
            between investigator and subject.

Nor is private information collected:

     "Private information"  includes information  about behavior
     that  occurs in  a context  in which  an individual  can
     reasonably expect that no observation or recording is taking
     place,  and information which has been provided for specific
     purposes by  an individual and  which the  individual can
     reasonably expect will not be  made public (for example,  a
     medical record).
 
     Such apparent  over-reaching contributes to  the concerns  of a
growing number of national scholars that IRBs,  however well-meaning,
have become  moral entrepreneurs who unnecessarily  subvert academic
freedom and the  expansion of empirical and  conceptual development,
especially in the cultural studies, such as occur in ethnography.
 
     A second significant  issue that troubles scholars  is how IRBs
enforce compliance.    Current policies at many  institutions drive
concerns of enforcement and compliance.   The two most troubling are
those of retroactive approval and the  need for annual renewal of IRB
approval for projects previously approved if data collection continues
or if data collected under previous  approval continues to be used in
ongoing analysis or publication.
 
     The retroactive approval is the  requirement that data collected
from human subjects cannot continue to be used unless the IRB approves
the methods of data collection and its uses.  For example,  some IRBs
would argue that a scholar who visited  a massage parlor over a period
of several months and later used  the visits to develop  research for
conference papers or publications, requires IRB approval.  The IRB at
one institution  notifies scholars  that if  they have  used human
subjects without IRB approval,  the  IRB will recommend to university
authorities  that the  scholar notify  funding  agencies or  "the
appropriate publication outlet  (journal or organization to  which a
manuscript or abstract has been submitted, thesis/dissertation,  etc.)
that the data were collected without IRB approval."
 
     Because there is  no statute of limitations,   and because the
policy would appear to include  post-hoc notification to professional
societies sponsoring a conference at which  a paper was presented that
the paper lacked IRB approval,  some  scholars judge this a Draconian
punitive sanction both unreasonable and unfeasible.
 
     Another  policy seems  to challenge  academic freedom.   One
university IRB policy specifies:

     If the data were collected for a thesis of dissertation, the
     methods section must contain a  statement that the data were
     collected without IRB approval.
 
     Dictating what an author, even a graduate student,  must write in
the text of research confirms, for some, that IRBs are out of control.
While it might be acceptable to  include the non-approval caveat in a
prefatory page, dictating the text of research publications is not.
 
     Because of such prescriptions, some scholars fear to approach the
IRB.   But,  the more common result  is confusion over what the IRB
requires and what outcomes follow from non-compliance.
 
     A  third conundrum  raises the  question,  "What  constitutes
research?"  Drawing from 45 CFR 46,   research refers to a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation,
designed to develop or contribute  to generalizable knowledge.  But,
when does research  become "research," and when does  a living human
become a "subject?"
 
     Consider the example of a scholar who attends a 12-step substance
abuse program for 12 months as a client, and keeps a detailed diary on
conversations, observations, and other experiences.  After a year, the
scholar begins  to recognize  themes,  patterns,   concepts,  and
theoretical connections  emerging from the  diaries and  decides to
publish the insights, drawing from the diaries as data.  Do the people
referred to  in the diaries now  become human subjects?    When the
researcher's experiences began,  he was simply recording observations
of interest that seemed relevant to his life.  Later, they stimulated
his thinking,  and he began  to "systematically" organize these past
experiences into a conceptual framework. Then, subsequent observations
were organized around this framework with the possibility, but not the
certainty, that they could be the basis of an ambitious set of papers.
Does "systematic investigation" refer to  data collection,  or to the
analysis,  or to dissemination "intended  to develop or contribute to
generalizable knowledge?"   Does,  as  one astute  observer noted,
"systematic" imply that the researcher  created the method,  or that
instead the method derived  from the structure of an a  priori set of
circumstances that drove  the method such that  the researcher placed
himself in an existing setting  that was not research-centered?   Is
this the IRBs decision?

                           Meme Maintenance
 
     At my institution, the IRB has generally been helpful.  Even when
requiring additional information,  which  sometimes seemed maddening,
they were  invariably supportive  and served  more as  researchers'
advocates rather than adversaries.  Yet, even at my institution, with
an eminently reasonable and helpful IRB,  the Board is still perceived
by many as a Star Chamber  whose career-affecting decisions are final,
unappealable, and capricious.   Here,  I offer a few policy-oriented
suggestions drawn from my own experience,   but that seem relevant to
the  experiences of  colleagues across  the  country.   Each  is
cost-effective,  designed to facilitate  researcher compliance while
protecting the integrity of inquiry, and easily implementable.   Some
of  the suggestions  overlap,  but  are  separated for  analytic
convenience.
 
     1. Communication.  IRBs must communicate with faculty.   Many of
the problems described here result  from the IRB failure,  especially
for qualitative researchers, to promote an understanding of its roles,
goals and what is expected of  researchers in their proposals.   More
simply,  IRBs create  many of their own problems  by not countering
misconceptions,  by appearing unresponsive  to legitimate criticisms,
and by continuing to reinforce the  image that they are an independent
tribunal with power  over scholarly careers.  Communication,   at a
minimum,  must include  a clear definition of  the expectations and
guidelines of IRB criteria and how they can be met. Researchers should
not be  expected to be  mind readers and  play a continual  game of
"catch-up" as each  new response to questions  generates an iterative
game of further question-and-answer.
 
     2. IRB Oversight.   Currently, IRBs lack an institutional appeals
process other than repeated submissions of the methodology to the same
committee.   The problems of  idiosyncrasy,  idiocy,  idolatry and
ideopraxis could be mitigated by a  mediating body to whom researchers
could  appeal  when  challenging decisions  and  policies.    An
institutional IRB oversight board, representative of scholars familiar
with human subjects research from diverse disciplines,  could serve as
a buffer between  both groups in resolving many of  the problems that
arise, or at least providing a mechanism for negotiating.
 
     3. IRB Advisory Resource.   Institutions should establish an IRB
advisor to  assist faculty  in preparing  their proposals  prior to
approval.  This not only symbolizes  an IRB/scholar unity,  but also
functions to reduce the possibility  of iterative questioning that can
result from the perceived need to second-guess IRB expectations.
 
     4. Open Discussion.   IRBs should engage in public dialogue with
faculty through public forums, roundtables, debates, discussions,  and
periodic open-ended input sessions in  which faculty can express their
concerns.  The feelings of powerlessness expressed by those frustrated
with IRB practices result in part  from the often justified perception
that IRB members are aloof,   anonymous,  and impervious to faculty
concerns.   Critics perceive  that they have no means  to redress or
challenge existing policies.
 
     5. Interpreting Guidelines.   IRBs are faced with the dilemma of
working through and interpreting existing guidelines, and defining how
they apply to  scholars at their institutions.  Yet,   many of the
interpretations, as suggested in the examples above, seem ad hoc, even
Kafkaesque.  IRB discretion to interpret  rules should be curtailed,
there  should be  oversight  on  the interpretations  to  reduce
idiosyncratic or ideological intrusions,  and  IRBs should provide a
forum for input on how rules are interpreted.
 
     6. Minimalism.   To protect their institutions from embarrassing
lapses in  human subjects protections,   or to  assure bureaucratic
paper-trail documentation in case of a  Federal audit,  some IRBs may
interpret  Federal guidelines  in  ways  that dramatically  expand
oversight,  such as redefining human  subjects research as studies of
"any living human."  Instead,  IRBs should be encouraged  to take a
minimalist, conservative approach,  confining themselves to the letter
of the law and  not expanding in ways that are  neither justified nor
acceptable.  Institutions should not leave interpretation of policies
to an a single person,  or even  to a single committee.  Rather,  a
committee of scholars representative of human subjects research should
participate fully  in helping to establish  institutional guidelines
complying with Federal regulations,  but that do not go beyond them in
unintended ways that result in a chilling effect on research.
 
     7. Universalism.  Currently, institutions set their own policies,
which of course preserves institutional autonomy.  But, in the case of
IRB oversight,   this leads to  wildly varying  interpretations of
policies  such that  two scholars  at  two different  institutions
conducting a  joint research  project run  the time-consuming  and
stress-inducing  risk that  the project  will be  approved at  one
institution and not at another.  IRBs should communicate not only with
their own constituency,  but with their peers elsewhere,  engaging in
dialog  and allowing  opportunities  for  their constituencies  to
participate as well.   While some  IRB members may attend appropriate
conferences or monitor highly visible cases of non-compliance,  these
tend to  address the  major issues of  protection rather  than the
smaller, often esoteric,  and highly specific protections issues more
common in  social science than  in biomedical or  behavioral science
research.
 
     8. "Grandfathering."  The fears of some faculty that they will be
penalized for past research for not bringing it before an IRB when the
rules were nonexistent, ambiguous,  loosely interpreted,  or ignored,
could be reduced by publicizing current  rules.  There should also be
explicit an unequivocal specification of the types of studies that are
exempt from  IRB oversight to assuage  the fears of  researchers who
anticipate consequences  of possible  "witch-hunts" and  assure that
there will be no retroactive search-and-destroy missions.
 
     9. IRB Training.  It is no secret that IRB personnel do not share
equal expertise  or familiarization  with the  issues.  While  IRB
personnel ostensibly receive orientation with rules,  given the power
they  have over  researchers--over  both  research procedures  and
psychological well-being--they  should be required to  have rigorous
training in all  aspects of human subjects  research,  Federal laws,
their responsibility to scholars as well as human subjects,  and above
all, common sense.
 
     10.  Assessment of  Need.   Both institutions and  IRBs should
periodically assess the need for human subjects protections. The adage
"if it ain't broke,  don't fix it"  applies to review of research as
well.  How many of the risks identified by the IRB actually constitute
realistic potential outcomes? At what point can researchers decide for
themselves that  a project need not  be submitted for  IRB approval
because the  costs of  review far outweigh  any reasonable  risk to
subjects? How much review is actually needed?   The broader issue here
is that perhaps the pendulum of protection  has swung too far,  and a
balance is needed both at Federal and institutional levels.
 
     11.  Remedial Reminders.   The  IRB should systematically issue
periodic  reminders  to  researchers about  the  obligations  and
expectations of the IRB.  Especially important are periodic reminders
to researchers who are required to renew approval.
 
     12. Tact.   Heavy-handed or threatening letters by the IRB to its
constituents serve  no purpose  and only  continue to  alienate the
research community.   If the IRB appears  to function more as policer
than protector,   it will increase  the alienation of  faculty and
exacerbate the  problems it  currently faces  in trying  to secure
cooperative compliance.
 
     13.  Defining  the "Master."  Do  the IRBs  serve researchers,
subjects, or fearful bureaucrats trying to protect their domain?  More
simply,  are they researcher advocates  or adversaries?   Because of
their status both as de facto and  de jure proxy for Federal agencies,
this issue is far more complex than  it seems,  and lies the heart of
many of the public relations problems that IRBs incur.
 
     14. The Qualitative Bias.  Not without justification, qualitative
researchers, especially ethnographers, perceive IRBs as reflect a bias
toward quantitative  research.  Because  Federal regulations  were
designed primarily  for biomedical  and behavioral  sciences,  the
criteria for assessing  research tend to be constructed  in ways that
are inapplicable  for those for  whom the  unit of analysis  is the
culture,  not the individual.  Also,   Federal guidelines were not
originally designed to  monitor or review research  in public spaces,
yet IRB procedures tend to expand into this domain as well.  IRB forms
are  designed  for  nomological-deductive  research,   and  the
narrative/story-telling style of ethnography  and similar qualitative
methods does not neatly fit  the categorical descriptions expected by
the IRB.
 
     15.  The Chilling Effect.  Judging from colleagues, IRBs have had
a demonstrable chilling effect on some scholars who have shifted their
research agendas to other areas in order to avoid the perceived hassle
of undergoing continued "IRB inquisitions."   The IRB should not only
recognize the possible chilling effect it has on research,  but should
also systematically  assess the broader  impact it has  on research,
especially on grant applications.
 
     16. Recognizing Professional Standards.   IRBs should be aware of
the professional standards guiding researchers.   Researchers,  with
rare exceptions that cannot be prevented by IRB oversight, are held to
high  ethical standards  by peer  review,  organizational  ethical
committees,  and the codes of  conduct of professional organizations.
For example,  some  IRB members vehemently cling to  the belief that
covert research is never justified,  and that consent forms are always
required in all research involving human subjects.  But, the American
Sociological Association, as one example,  explicitly acknowledges in
its code of ethics that consent forms,  on occasion,  may be neither
necessary nor  feasible.  It  also acknowledges  that,  in  some
circumstances, covert research may be necessary and appropriate.  IRBs
should  take great  care not  to attempt  to replace  professional
standards with their own.
 
     17.  Establishing Limits.   IRBs  should establish explicit and
unequivocal parameters on what constitutes  human subjects review and
what does  not.   Much of  the current confusion  involves "exempt"
research, which refers to research that an IRB, on review,  judges to
be exempt from its purview.   But, other types of research are exempt
from submission to the IRB altogether. Where lies the line? IRBs ought
take great care to restrict its domain  by defining what does not need
review.
 
     18. Avoid Patronizing.   Many scholars feel that the IRB assumes
that faculty lack ethics,  experience in dealing with human subjects,
and an understanding of risks.  In the perception of some researchers,
the IRB acts as if human subjects researchers have been in need of its
wisdom to guide them from malfeasance. Yet, many scholars have had far
more experience in dealing with the  ethical and other complexities of
human subjects research  than the combined IRB.   When IRBs dismiss
researchers' experiences, training, and past history, researchers feel
patronized,  become  offended,  and the  distance between  the two
escalates.   IRBs should recognize that  scholars have obligations to
their peers, their subjects, and their professional organizations, and
many mechanisms  are currently  in place  to provide  guidance and
oversight.
 
     19.  Reign in the Scope.   IRB boards should remember that their
domain is  the protection of  human subjects,  not  broader ethical
oversight.   Few IRB members are  trained in metaphysics,  and their
attempts to intrude only lead to chaos.
 
     20. Researchers Obligations.   The previous suggestions identify
ways that the IRB can improve its image. But, researchers also have an
obligation. By aggressively raising IRB issues both within and outside
of their institutions, and by engaging in education of and dialog with
IRBs and colleagues,  the more egregious practices of oversight can be
modified, policies challenged, and the myth-making power of the horror
stories rechanelled in ways that more fully integrate the needs of the
IRBs with those  of both human subjects and  the academic community,
thus altering  the loosely-coupled relationship  between researchers,
IRB, and Federal agencies.
 
     At the heart of this list  of suggestions lies the credibility of
IRBs,  the support  they receive from faculty,   the protection of
research integrity, and and protection of academic freedom.   Whether
people agree or disagree with these suggestions, the fact remains that
IRBs face a dilemma:  They can, finally, begin to more fully cooperate
with faculty to the same extent  that they expect faculty cooperation,
or they jeopardize  their credibility in the  institutional community
while,  ironically,  attempting  to establish it with  the Federal
agencies to whom they are accountable.
 
                    Conclusion: Idiopathy (Redux)
                    __________  _________  _____
 
     Who needs ethics? We all do.   One area where we can demonstrate
our ethical practices lies in the  protection of human subjects.  So,
the question isn't "Do we need  human subjects protections" and IRBs,
but rather how  the policies are implemented.  The  current fears of
researchers have been translated into animosity toward IRBs, resulting
in acrimony, hostility,  threatened non-compliance,  and considerable
angry discussion both at national and institutional levels.   Many of
the concerns  are legitimate and  risk subverting  academic inquiry.
Others, however,  reflect the IRBs' own attempts to decipher complex,
ambiguous, and sometimes excessive guidelines.
 
     I have attempted here to identify  some of the sources of concern
and how these  generate the current antipathy for  IRB practices and
policies.   Many of  the problems separating IRBs are  the result of
Federally imposed restrictions  over which IRBs have  little control.
Others,  however,  are the result of  the isolation of IRBs and the
misunderstandings that  all stake-holders have about  the constraints
and needs of each other.  I have argued here that much of the distance
between  IRBs and  the  research community  can  be resolved  by
cost-effective meme maintenance.   The solution  is to recognize that
the antidote to idiopathy,  the current state of affairs in which IRBs
arguably generate many of their own problems,  is a healthy injection
of more communication, public dialog, and aggressive re-examination of
the complex relationship between oversight bodies,  regulatory bodies,
and those they affect.
 
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Any questions, drop me a note. Jim Thomas - jthomas@sun.soci.niu.edu