Introduction: A Debate about the Ethics of Fair Practices for
Collecting Social Science Data in Cyberspace
Jim Thomas
Department of Sociology
Northern Illinois University
(19 Jan '96)
ABSTRACT
Most of us prefer "doing right" to the opposite. But, sometimes
it is not easy to determine either what constitutes right conduct
or how to do it. In this special ethics issue of TIS, scholars
involved in cyberspace research explore the problem of "doing
right" by research subjects. The participants here draw from
their own research and the ethical dilemmas they confronted. The
offerings illustrate how diverse ethical theories can lead to
different views over which, or even whether, formal guidelines
are needed for online research.
INTRODUCTION: A DEBATE ABOUT THE ETHICS OF FAIR PRACTICES FOR
COLLECTING SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN CYBERSPACE
Most of us prefer "doing right" to the opposite. But, sometimes
it is not easy to determine either what constitutes right conduct
or how to do it. In this special ethics issue of TIS, scholars
involved in cyberspace research explore the problem of "doing
right" by research subjects.
In FUTURE SHOCK, Alvin Toffler observed that the future arrives
too soon and in the wrong order. If the future "happened" in the
right order, it would mean that our ability to understand and
respond to changes would come prior to, rather than after, events
occurred. If the future had the decency not to arrive too soon,
we could better-prepare for it by predicting potential problems
and proactively identifying possible solutions. One of the
problems arising from the future-is-now expansion of computer
technology is establishing the ethics by which scholars ought
proceed when venturing into cyberspace.
Although some consider the term "cyberspace" a hackneyed phrase,
it remains useful to denote something that happens with people
using computers. By now, most of us realize that "cyberspace" is
not a specific geographic or spatial location. "Cyberspace"
connotes interaction with others by means of a
personal computer and a modem. As we sit at the computer keyboard
and magically etch our ASCII for others to see, we feel as if we
leave it somewhere, and that "somewhere" is simply a conceptually
metaphoric way of identifying the experience of electronic
communication. Cyberspace includes a variety of forums and
activities ranging from bulletin board systems (BBSes);
electronic mail; public access systems where people meet, shop,
argue, heal, fall in and out of love, or carouse; electronic
discussion groups (such as Usenet or the Newsgroup hotlines); and
real-time interaction, such as on-line "chat/talk" or IRC
(Inter-relay chat), which allows simultaneous communication
between scores of people. Where there are people, researchers
are sure to follow.
It's no secret that social science researchers have found
cyberspace to be a rich source of data. Whether labelled
"computer-mediated communication," "cyberculture," or simply
"digital life," scholars are examining the same topics online
that have long been the staple of offline social inquiry. This
expansion of cyberstudies brings with it questions of the ethics
guiding how we gather data, treat subjects, and make public the
results.
The participants here draw from their own research and the
ethical dilemmas they confronted. Although the perspectives vary
dramatically, there is convergence on several points. First, all
participants agree that research in cyberspace provides no
special dispensation to ignore ethical precepts. Researchers are
as obligated to protect human subjects and "do right" in
electronic venues as in more conventional ones. Second, each
participant recognizes that cyberspace poses complex ethical
issues that may lack exact analogs in other types of inquiry.
The ease of covert observation, the occasional blurry distinction
between public and private venues, and the difficulty of
obtaining the informed consent of subjects make cyber-research
particularly vulnerable to ethical breaches by even the most
scrupulous scholars. Third, all recognize that because a
research procedures or activities may be permissible or not
precluded by law or policy, it does not follow that they are
necessarily ethical or allowable. Fourth, all agree that the
individual researcher has the ultimate responsibility for
assuring that inquiry is not only done honestly, but done with
ethical integrity.
The commentators here differ on how to establish and define
ethical behavior and on the basic premises on which such behavior
rests. Are existing professional guidelines sufficient, or
should we create new invariant guidelines specifically for
cyber-research? Or, are ethics situational, dependant on
relativistic norms or negotiated agreements? That researchers
are ultimately responsible for the ethics of their research does
not mean that they are solely or wholly responsible for the
burden of protecting subjects from every conceivable harm. How,
then, should "harm" be assessed and the responsibilities be
distributed?
THE FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH ETHICS
It is useful to distinguish between ethics and morality. Ethics
refer to the character or conscience of a person in relation to a
group, and morality refers to the value system of a group in
relation to the individual. Stanage (1995) summarizes ethics as
person-in-culture, and morality as culture-in-person to remind us
that the two may not always coincide. Because research proceeds
from the obligations of an individual in relation to a group
(professional associations, community of scholars, society), we
limit the discussion to ethics.
The ethical perspectives espoused here reflect diverse and often
competing views, ranging from rejection of the possibility or
desirability of explicit guidelines to a call for formal codified
rules. Ethical frameworks are often divided into two broad
theories: Deontological and teleological (or
"consequentialist"). There are others, such as postmodernist
ethics or dialogic perspectives, but these less common.
DEONTOLOGICAL POSITIONS
Deontological positions are based on "rule following" and proceed
from formally specified precepts that guide how we ought to
behave. An example would be professional codes of ethics in the
social sciences, which codify researchers' obligations and
responsibilities to research subjects.
Deontological positions are often further subdivided into
"act-deontological" and "rule-deontological." In the former,
basic judgments of value are particularistic or situational,
drawing on shared principles of, for example, "justice" to
establish the proper course of action in a given situation. In
the latter, behavior is guided by concrete, universal rules, such
as "thou shalt not lie."
An example will help illustrate the difference between the two
positions. Consider the case of two prison researchers, both of
whom promised their subjects complete confidentiality in exchange
for candid information. In each case, the information is "dirty"
(Thomas and Marquart, 1988) in that revelation could put the
subjects at legal or other risk. Both researchers elicited from
prison staff detailed information describing mistreatment of
prisoners. In both cases, the researchers were subpoenaed to
testify against their research subjects in civil suits against
prison staff. One researcher broke his vow of confidentiality
and testified, with unpleasant consequences for subjects. The
other did not. Both appealed to the "rules" of an ethical theory
to justify their actions. The researcher who testified adhered to
an act-deontological position in which the particular
circumstances, abuse of authority and corresponding subversion of
justice by those sworn to uphold it, compelled him in this
situation to break his promise in order to fulfill a higher
principle. The researcher who remained silent adhered to a
rule-deontological position: He made a promise that he was
duty-bound to keep, regardless of the consequences. Both
decisions proceeded from strong ethical principles, and neither
researcher could be faulted for his respective decision.
TELEOLOGICAL (CONSEQUENTIALIST) PERSPECTIVES
A "teleological" perspective, associated with, but not exclusive
to, Utilitarianism," operates from the premise that ethical
behavior is determined by the consequences of an act. Some
erroneously construe this to mean that "the end justifies the
means," but this is misleading. Teleological perspectives hold
that the goal or end of an act should be weighed with a calculus
that, on balance, will result in the greatest social good or the
least social harm. Utilitarianism, the most common form of
teleological theories, is also divided into two variants:
Act-utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarianism
holds that correct actions are contingent upon the particular
nature of the situation, and the guiding principle is the degree
to which the specific act will maximize the greatest balance of
"good." Rule-utilitarianism, associated with John Stuart Mill,
emphasizes the primacy of general rules of conduct, but these
rules are derived from the principle of the greatest universal
utility, which is:
...that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only
things desirable as ends; and that all desirable
things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in
any other scheme) are desirable either for pleasure
inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of
pleasure and the prevention of pain (Mill, 1957:
10-11).
"Happiness" in this perspective is neither a hedonistic nor an
indolently selfish concept, but based instead on the cultivation
of the "public good" and the utility of the act as a means toward
that end. Unlike teleologists, Utilitarians argue that theirs
avoids becoming entrapped in normative or contradictory rules and
potentially relativistic duty-imposing obligations.
Consider again the researcher who broke his vow of
confidentiality to testify against his informants. If, instead
of appealing to a transcendent rule, he had argued that his
testimony was necessary to end abuse of prisoners by staff and
thereby promote justice as a social good, he could make his case
from an act-utilitarian position. By contrast, a
rule-utilitarian approach is not uncommon amongst journalists
who argue that invasions of personal privacy are outweighed by
the public's "right to know," or amongst researchers who
intentionally lie to gain access to "deviant" research settings
on the grounds that it is the only way to obtain information on
an intellectually important topic.
Mapping out the broad brushstrokes of competing ethical
perspectives serves several purposes. First, it provides a
backdrop against which we can more easily highlight the
principles by which ethical problems are identified and solutions
to them sought. Second, it helps us to understand the
fundamental premises of our own and others' ethical perspectives.
This can be useful when attempting to clarify the differences in
various positions, and to remind us that research ethics are
complex. Finally, locating our own ethical positions within
existing theories helps clarify our own thinking by teasing out
the sources of the principles to which we adhere, why we adhere
to them, and the implications of our choices on both our
scholarship and our
CONVENTIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES
The guidelines that inform the policies and standards of most
universities and professional associations derive from two
documents, The Belmont Report (1979) and the Federal Register
(1991). The former, reflecting a teleological perspective,
offers basic principles. The latter, most closely derived from a
rule-deontological position, specifies rules and obligations.
Both The Belmont Report and the Federal Register (1991) provide
a boiler plate model followed by state and many other
institutions in establishing principles and policies for all
researchers, whether funded or non-funded, who conduct research
under the university's name. The wording of my own university's
Graduate School Office of Research Compliance guidelines is
fairly standard:
I. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
A. This institution is guided by the ethical
principles regarding all research involving
humans as subjects, as set forth in the report of
the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research (entitled: _Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Research_ ((the "Belmont Report"))),
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE RESEARCH IS SUBJECT TO
FEDERAL REGULATION, OR WITH WHOM CONDUCTED, OR
SOURCE OF SUPPORT (I.E., SPONSORSHIP). (emphasis
added--jt)
Unlike Federal or institutional rules, the Belmont Report
(BR) specifies three broad principles (rather than explicit
rules) to guide research.
1) RESPECT FOR PERSONS:
Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical
convictions: first, that individuals should be treated
as autonomous agents, and second, that persons with
diminished autonomy are entitled to protection (BR: 4).
Although intended primarily to protect from abuse those persons
not fully capable of making an informed decision to participate
in research (eg, the mentally disabled or institutionalized
persons), respect for persons extends to others, and includes
providing adequate information about the research:
In most cases of research involving human subjects, respect
for persons demands that subjects enter into the research
voluntarily and with adequate information (BR: 4).
2) BENEFICENCE: This principle extends the Hippocratic maxim of
"do no harm" to the ethical obligations of a researcher:
Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by
respecting their decisions and by protecting them from harm,
but also by making efforts to secure their well-being. Such
treatment falls under the principle of beneficence. The
term "beneficence" is often understood to cover acts of
kindness or charity that go beyond strict obligation. In
this document, beneficence is understood in a strong sense,
as an obligation. Two general rules have been formulated as
complementary expressions of beneficent actions in this
sense: (1) do not harm and (2) maximize possible benefits
and minimize possible harms (BR: 4).
The principle of beneficence assumes that scholars will carefully
think through the implications of their research, especially in
sensitive topics where the subjects could be placed in physical,
social, or legal jeopardy.
3) JUSTICE: The principle of justice centers on "who ought to
receive the benefits of research and bear its burdens" (BR: 5).
The Belmont Report conceptualizes the principle of justice as
placing an obligation on the researcher to assess the
distribution of "fairness" toward the research subjects and
social interests.
HOW SHOULD THESE PRINCIPLES BE APPLIED?
The Belmont Report identifies several ways by which the
principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice can
be implemented. One way is INFORMED CONSENT:
While the importance of informed consent is
unquestioned, controversy prevails over the nature and
possibility of an informed consent. Nonetheless, there
is widespread agreement that the consent process can be
analyzed as containing three elements: information,
comprehension, and voluntariness (BR: 5).
INFORMATION:
Most codes of research establish specific items for
disclosure intended to assure that subjects are given
sufficient information. These items generally include:
the research procedure, their purposes, risks and
anticipated benefits, alternative procedures (where
therapy is involved), and a statement offering the
subject the opportunity to ask questions and to
withdraw at any time from the research (BR: 5).
COMPREHENSION
Another way to implement the Belmont Report principles is by
assuring that research subjects comprehend the information and
understand what they are consenting to:
The manner and context in which information is conveyed is
as important as the information itself. For example,
presenting information in a disorganized and rapid fashion,
allowing too little time for consideration or curtailing
opportunities for questioning, all may adversely affect a
subject's ability to make an informed choice (BR: 6).
VOLUNTARINESS
Finally, the Belmont Report principles can be implemented only if
the subjects give consent voluntarily:
This element of informed consent requires conditions free
of coercion and undue influence. Coercion occurs when an
overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one
person to another in order to obtain compliance. Undue
influence, by contrast, occurs through an offer of an
excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or
other overture in order to obtain compliance (BR: 6).
The spirit and letter of the Belmont report is explicitly and
unequivocally clear:
1. Researchers are ethically bound to protect their
subjects from potential risks or unnecessary harm.
2. Researchers are ethically bound to obtain consent from
their research subjects
3. Researchers are ethically obligated to inform their
subjects of the nature of the study and potential risks
4. Deception or other trickery employed to manipulate
subjects into participating in research is a fundamental
violation of the Belmont Report principles.
WHAT IS HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH?
Professional societies such as the APA (American Psychological
Association) and ASA (American Sociological Association) provide
ethical guidelines shaped by Federal, institutional, and other
sources. Federal guidelines (FR, 1991)
specify a number of reasonable explicit rules. Violations of
these rules place a research project or an institution in
non-compliance with Federally and other mandated ethical
standards.
The term "research" refers to "a systematic investigation,
including research development, testing and evaluation, designed
to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge" (FR
102(d)).
(f) _Human Subject_ means a living individual about whom an
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting
research obtains
(1) data through intervention or interaction with the
individual, or
(2) identifiable private information....INTERACTION
includes communication or interpersonal contact between
investigator and subject. "Private information" includes
information about behavior that occurs in a context in
which an individual can reasonably expect that no
observation or recording is taking place, and information
which has been provided for specific purposes by an
individual and which the individual can reasonably expect
will not be made public (for example, a medical record).
Private information must be individually identifiable
(i.e., the identity of the subject is or may readily be
ascertained by the investigator or associated with the
information) in order for obtaining the information to
constitute research involving human subjects (FR,
102(f)(2).
Institutions that receive federal research funds, including
private ones, are required to implement procedures to assure
compliance with Federal guidelines:
(a) Each institution engaged in research which is covered
by this policy and which is conducted or supported by a
federal department or agency shall provide written
assurance satisfactory to the department or agency head
that it will comply with the requirements set forth in this
policy (FR: 103(a)).
There are some exceptions to the review requirement for human
subjects, such as when conducting general educational tests or
surveys, engaging in policy evaluation, or gathering data that is
either public.
Federal guidelines also specifically and unequivocally require
informed consent (FR: 116):
Except as provided elsewhere in this policy, no
investigator may involve a human being as a subject in
research covered by this policy unless the investigator
has obtained the legally effective informed consent of
the subject or the subject's legally authorized
representative.
The exceptions include the type of research exempted from human
subjects review. The elements of informed consent include 1)
identification of the research project, and the purposes,
duration, and procedures to be followed; 2) A description of
foreseeable risks or discomforts; 3) A description of benefits to
the subject; 4) A description of the extent to which
confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be
maintained.
From this summary, two points are clear. First, it is
indisputable that cyberspace research entails "human subjects."
Second, it is clear that existing guidelines apply to cyberspace
research, even when data are gathered covertly. Human subjects
research guidelines defining and mandating ethical
pre/proscriptions function as more than regulations to which
institutional recipients of federal grants must adhere. They also
establish explicit conventions recognized by professionals as the
minimal model of ethics for identifying subjects, acquiring data,
protecting subjects' privacy and other legitimate interests, and
writing or disseminating final results to the public.
DO WE NEED NEW GUIDELINES?
Schrum (1995) makes a strong argument for articulating new rules
for the new electronic medium, and she identifies eleven
guidelines for ethical electronic research. But, not all would
agree that we need them. Are existing guidelines, such as those
summarized above, sufficient to guide cyber-research? Or, as some
argue, can we negotiate or append to them additional or
alternative rules or principles that address the specific
problems of the relatively new medium? The answer depends in
part on whether one views cyberspace as so unique that current
ethical standards lack the utility to address new questions. On
this, there is disagreement.
STORM KING: King's essay provides the organizing theme around
which participants here build and elaborate their own
conceptions of research ethics. King, a doctoral candidate in
clinical psychology, draws from his dissertation project on
"virtual support groups" to illustrate the ethical dilemmas in
shifting between the public realm of research revelation and the
private arena of confidentially. He argues that ethical problems
in research may not always be immediately evident when a topic or
field is new. Problems gradually arise, and individual
researchers must be constantly vigilant for them and aware of
ethical responsibilities to assure that no harm comes to
subjects. He suggests that, because cyberspace is new, both
technologically and as a research venue, we must establish new
guidelines that recognize its uniqueness.
King focuses primarily on the relationship of the researcher to
the subjects in electronic forums. His central thesis is that
group accessibility in Internet forums dissolves the distinction
between public and private places that normally guide scholars
in following conventional guidelines of anonymity,
confidentiality, or informed consent. As a consequence, the
researcher, he argues, should initially confer to all electronic
communications the status of "private" to assure that subjects
are protected. However, he recognizes the difficulty that rigid
adherence to this doctrine could raise, and tempers it by
suggesting a continuum in which "the lower the level of Group
accessibility and the higher the degree of Perceived Privacy, the
more care must be taken to avoid harming group members." He
argues in favor of "non-reactive" research methods that minimize
intrusion into the setting. He concludes by offering concrete
guidelines for research.
DENNIS WASKUL: Like King, Waskul draws from his dissertation
studies to argue that, in cyberspace, conventional concepts of
public and private dissolve, and one problem facing those who
would "do right" requires formulating a new conception of "public
space" that narrows the boundaries of what we consider "public."
Waskul finds little merit in the arguments of those researchers
who make an explicit distinction between public and private
communications, and none in the claim that public Net postings
may be treated the same as public behavior in, say, a public
park. He is especially attentive to the possible false sense of
anonymity that researchers may impute to electronic
communications. Waskul narrows King's boundaries of the
public/private spheres by arguing that online communicants may
act privately even in public settings. As a consequence,
data-gathering methods based on the public/private dichotomy "do
not provide a sound basis for making sound ethical decisions that
protect the interests of participants."
Both King and Waskul make impassioned and reasonable arguments
for explicit rules. Others, however, find the commitment to
invariant rules or guidelines restrictive, perhaps dogmatic, even
containing the ironic potential to contribute to, rather than
lead us out of, ethical lapses. This occurs in part because of
the limitations of a deontological position in research settings
with ambiguous meanings and conflicting norms, and in part
because application of specific guidelines or principles to a
narrow band of possible research methods and problems limit their
utility.
SHARON BOEHLEFELD: Boehlefeld draws both from her two decades as
a journalist and her dissertation experiences to remind us that
our ethical obligations extend beyond those owed to our research
subjects. Ethical obligations include not only how we gather
data, but also how we store and disseminate them. The Association
of Computing Machinery (ACM) guidelines, she argues, provide a
helpful framework for thinking about how researchers, systems
administrators, and others with access to computer-generated
information should attend to ethical issues. She identifies five
attributes of communications media to challenge the
blurred-boundaries thesis between public and private electronic
discourse.
SUSAN HERRING: Where Boehlefeld urged us to remember the
diversity of players in the research enterprise who are obligated
to attend to ethical issues, Herring reminds us that there are
also different types of research, and not all of them can be, or
even ought to be, subject to rigid guidelines. Absolutist
guidelines, she judges, can hamper research by ignoring the
diversity and complexity of cyberspace and cyberspace
scholarship. She builds her case with an analogy between
tape-recorded and ASCII data collection.
Herring also distinguishes between data used primarily for
textual analysis and data used to describe individual or group
interaction. The latter invariably pose more ethical problems
than the former because of the personal detail about participants
they may provide. Drawing from research in her forthcoming
edited volume (Herring, forthcoming), she cites linguistic
positivistism as an example of the type of research that would
seem to pose minimal ethical problems. This occurs, she says,
because the focus is on the structure and use of textual
communication.
ELIZABETH REID: Reid identifies specific problems she
encountered during her two years of MUD (Multiple User Dungeon)
research. Her work reinforces the precept that courtesy, as well
as ethics, ought be a methodological norm. She describes how and
why she obtained consent prior to publishing the posts of her
subjects. Reid describes an unusual problem: Her subjects
appeared eager to be part of the study, and she was faced with
the task of an abundance of potentially sensitive data that she
had permission to publish, but that required cautious selection
to protect the MUD participants. Reid also discovered a more
subtle problem. After she left the field and disseminated her
results both in print and on the Net, other researchers filled
the vacuum created by her departure. This resulted in feelings of
distrust and wariness amongst MUD participants, and participation
declined. This adds another layer of ethical concerns on the
research: What obligations do we have to minimize disruption,
and how can especially participant observers enter and exit
gracefully (Maines and Kappas, 1978).
CHRISTINA ALLEN: Allen provides the most provocative view of
ethics in arguing that even reasonable ethical prescriptions risk
"eroding the responsibility for ethical action on the part of the
researcher in every situation." Allen does not reject the
authority of established rules as appropriate guidelines for
ethical action. Instead, as with all rules, she believes that
they need to be critically considered, re-accentuated and
re-assimilated for each situation. For her, established codes
are often the result of distilling ethical wisdom from past
experiences, and as such, form an important ingredient to any
ethical work in any situation. Drawing from Mikhail Bahktin, she
argues that ethical precepts can and ought be negotiated by
"engaging in creative 'ethical work' in situ, in dialogue with
participants and perhaps other researchers, and throughout the
research and publication processes." She argues that reliance on
formal rules can break down in part because the researcher's
perceptions and interpretations may not match those of subjects.
She accepts Bahktin's dictum that "one cannot live ethically by
reproducing established 'rhythms'," but must instead recognize
each situation as one requiring receptivity to each unique
context.
Her position suggests a blend of critical theory and
postmodernism. Consistent with critical theorists such as Jurgen
Habermas (1984), Allen's call for a negotiated ethics presupposes
the possibility of power-free and consensual discourse in which
all participants possess the will and the means to engage in
dialogue and come to agreement on common understandings for
action. In rejecting the "Golden Rule," Allen assumes the stance
of Rorty's (1989: xiii) liberal ironist, for whom there is no
easy answer to the question "why not be cruel?" Like Rorty and
Bahktin, Allen implicitly suggests that ethics are grounded in a
principle of solidarity to be realized in a vocabulary, rather
than in a proposition.
JIM THOMAS: To illustrate why scholars and non-scholars alike
should take an interest in research ethics, I conclude this
selection of essays by describing a highly visible and seemingly
innocent research project that contained serious ethical lapses.
I argue that existing guidelines and principles, had they been
observed at numerous gatekeeping points, could have prevented the
problems. I suggest that, at root, three basic guidelines are
sufficient to guide us in doing right:" Never put our subjects at
risk, never lie to them, and minimize social harm while enhancing
social good.
CONCLUSION
The offerings here illustrate how diverse ethical theories can
lead to different views over which, or even whether, formal
guidelines are needed for online research. King and Waskul,
grounded in a deontological theories, argue that formal rules are
needed. Boehlefeld, Herring, Reid, and Thomas, preferring a
teleological approach, judge that broad principles of social good
rather than invariant precepts are better. Allen, flirting with
postmodernism, would privilege neither rules nor broad
guidelines. Instead, she sees ethics as embedded within, and
emerging out of dialogue with, the specific group under study.
The authors make no effort to critique these positions in their
essays. Rather, they lay out their position as it applies to
their own research. They have, however, set up an electronic
discussion group where critiques and comments can be debated or
clarified. TIS readers are invited to join in the discussion by
sending this message:
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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