EXERCISE 5: TEAM B Jennifer Johnson Jeffrey Davis INTRODUCTION: RESOLVED: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS TOO SOFT ON JUVENILES Juveniles commit far fewer violent crimes than adults, and most of their crimes are non-violent (OJJDP, 2003, http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/201370/page2.html. But even though the juvenile crime rate for violent and property crimes continues to decline over the past 12 years, juveniles still commit too many crimes. Juveniles between 12-17 are very roughly 7 percent of the US population, but juvenile males account for about 15 percent of all arrests, 17 percent if we include females. Worse, youths between 10-14 commit about 40 of all juvenile crimes (US Dept of Justice, 2002: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#crime). We should not congratulate ourselves on the drop in the juvenile crime rate, because it is obvious that it is still to high, that younger juveniles are not being be helped by the rehabilitation model, and that we need new alternatives to fight juvenile crime. It's time we return to the punishment model, because coddling offenders obviously doesn't work. It's good that the juvenile crime rate continues to drop. But it would drop more if we stopped coddling juvenile offenders at all stages of the juvenile justice process. Our team will demonstrate 1. How the system is too soft in police handling of juveniles 2. How the court system is too soft 3. How especially incarceration programs is too soft The Classical school of criminology describes the best way to reduce crime is to create deterrents. This means that punishment should be swift, certain, and severe. There should be consequences for acts, and we should teach youths at an early age to take responsibility for their behavior rather than being soft. We believe in tough love, not a velvet glove. The Illinois juvenile corrections facilities not only coddle criminals, but they are expensive. Illinois has the following Illinois Youth Center (IYC) facilities (IDOC, 2004). NAME SECURITY POPULATION OPENED COST/INMATE Chicago (M/F) Med 91 1999 $82,254 Harrisburg (M) Med 393 1983 $46,609 Joliet (M) Max 304 1959 $52,930 Kewanee (M) Med 98 2001 $134,913 Murphysboro Med 156 1997 $70,997 Pere Marquete Med 41 1963 $84,839 St Charles Med 435 1904 $52,462 The costs of running these institutions is double, and for Kewanee six times the cost of adult institutions. According to IDOC homepage that lists facilities (IDOC, 2004), all of these facilities are program oriented with specialized staff, and that's why the costs are so high. Some of the programs listed on the homepage include, such as education and vocational training are necessary. But the conditions are too soft. According to reports from St Charles, our text, and the experiences of people who work in them, they also allow for: 1. Pizzas or McDonalds brough in from the outside 2. campus-like living 3. Tvs and radios 4. Fun-oriented activities 5. Commissaries filled with candy and potato chips 6. Swimming pools and outings 7. Family-style relationships with staff 8. Soft attention 9. Rec buildings with play stations Face it. These are young criminals. They know the difference between right and wrong. Yes, give them basic programs, but don't give them any more than others youths who live on the streets, and don't let them have tvs and food at tax-payers expense. This only encourages them that "prison isn't so bad" and will not only not deter them as juveniles, but will continue to reward them so that they will continue to violate the law as adults. It's time we made punishment more severe to deter these young hoodlums from preying on law abiding citizens at tax-payers expense. BIBLIOGRAPHY Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). 2004. http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ Juvenile Justice - FYI. 2004. "Juvenile Crime." http://www.juvenilejusticefyi.com/juvenile_crimes.html United States Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Program. 2003. http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/201370/contents.html http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/201370/page2.html
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/reentry/learn.html
The following are statistics useful in presenting the point that yes we do need to buckle down on these kids
The statistics regarding juvenile offenders present a similar picture. Juveniles were involved in 16 percent of all violent crime1 arrests and 32 percent of all property crime2 arrests in 1999. Based on the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.s (OJJDP.s) Census of
Below, is good evidence why punishment needs to be stricter for juveniles. Jus the fact that a small percentage of juveniles commit the crimes, shows they know how to work the system and this needs to be reversed
Juveniles in Residential Placement (Sickmund, 2000), an estimated 100,000 youth are released from secure and residential facilities every year and because the length of incarceration for juveniles is shorter than for adults, a relatively greater percentage of juveniles return to the community each year. In addition, research indicates that a small percentage of juvenile offenders commit the overwhelming majority of juvenile crime.
Some correctional officials.under pressure to cut costs.have curtailed prison programs and services that could ameliorate factors that place inmates at higher risk of recidivism after release. Tougher sentencing laws have, in some cases, removed or limited inmates. incentives to enter available treatment programs.
The above is good, it shows they are trying to stop the coddling
Long, fixed prison terms for serious offenders can sometimes have the perverse effect of returning the most risky offenders to the community with the least control and supervision. There is sometimes little continuity between institutional programs and activities, offenders. reentry plans, and the supervision and services they receive once released. Communities of law-abiding citizens are victimized by these offenders, making these communities less safe, less desirable places to live.
SO, if these programs worked together more efficiently would that help
Research has shown that criminal behavior can be predicted for individual offenders on the basis of certain factors.3 Some factors, such as criminal history, are static and unchangeable. Others, such as substance abuse, antisocial attitudes, and antisocial associates, are dynamic and changeable. With proper assessment of these factors, researchers and practitioners can classify groups of offenders according to their relative likelihood of committing new offenses with as much as 80 percent accuracy.
Application of the risk principle requires matching levels or intensity of treatment/supervision with the risk levels of offenders. High-risk offenders require intensive interventions to reduce recidivism (Gendreau and Andrews, 1990). Since the return of these high-risk adult and juvenile offenders is imminent, corrections, law enforcement, and community service agencies should collaborate to monitor offenders while assisting them in the development and implementation of a concrete, specific reentry plan.
1 Violent crime includes criminal homicide, sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault.
2 Property crime includes burglary, larceny-theft, auto theft, and arson.
3 Such factors could include, but are not limited to, prior convictions for violent offenses or serious offenses that may not be defined by statute as violent; violent, assaultive, predatory, or disruptive in-prison behavior; and other high-risk factors that may include affiliation with gangs or security threat groups.
So, if we can predict who these kids are maybe we could argue a thougher "everyday" plan for them. THis reentry idea is better but, I think they need hard work daily, they need to be slave driven for awhile maybe they'd then learn not to be so irresponsible. Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative
The Reentry Initiative represents a new way of doing business for federal, state, and local agencies. Instead of focusing the Initiative on a competition for a limited amount of discretionary funds, the federal partners are coming together to help state and local agencies navigate the complex field of existing state formula and block grants and to assist them in accessing, redeploying, and leveraging those resources to support all components of a comprehensive reentry program. The discretionary funding available through this Initiative will be provided only to fill any gaps in existing federal, state, and local resources.
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