MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS[1]

OSCAR GRUSKY

ABSTRACT

A negative correlation is found between (1) rates of managerial succession and effectiveness and (2) change in succession rate and change in organizational effectiveness among sixteen professional baseball teams examined over two time periods, 1921–41 and 1951–58.

A set of ten variables from organization theory is applied to the analysis of team performance and administrative succession. A number of illustrative propositions are presented.

The major purpose of this study was to test two related hypotheses: (1) that rates of administrative succession and degree of organizational effectiveness are negatively correlated, and (2) that a change in the rate of administrative succession is negatively correlated with a change in organizational effectiveness.[2] The hypotheses are deliberately stated so as not to attribute causality solely to either succession or effectiveness. We assumed that the variables induce reciprocal effects. High rates of succession should produce declining organizational effectiveness, and low effectiveness should encourage high rates of administrative succession.

To obtain anything resembling an adequate field test of these hypotheses required a substantial number of formal organizations that, ideally, were identical in official goals, size, and authority structure. If the objectives of the organizations were not similar, then obviously it would not be feasible to compare their relative effectiveness, since this concept refers to the extent to which an organization is able to move toward the accomplishment of its official aims. We know that for business organizations and certain public agencies, and perhaps for other kinds as well, rates of succession are positively related to organizational size.[3] Therefore, we sought a sample of organizations of similar size.

There is some evidence, although it is highly limited, that organizations with different types of authority structures respond in very different ways to personnel changes at top levels in the hierarchy.[4] Hence, organizations with similar types of structures of authority were desirable.

In addition, a relatively "clean" field test of the hypotheses demanded reliable and valid measures of rates of administrative succession and organizational effectiveness.

[1] A number of people have contributed to this study. I am grateful to Judith Kairath for doing the coding and to John Vincent and Jerry King for computational work. The Helms Athletic Foundation was most gracious in permitting use of its library and records. I am also indebted to the members of the Department of Sociology, University of California, Davis, for their numerous helpful comments when an earlier version of this paper was presented at a seminar. Professors Mayer Zald, Charles R. Wright, and Fritz J. Roethlisberger and an anonymous reviewer gave much constructive advice. This is an expanded version of a paper read at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association in Washington, D.C., 1962.

[2] This hypothesis was discussed in my "Administrative Succession in Formal Organizations," *Social Forces*, XXXIX (December, 1960), 105–15.

[3] See my "Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (November, 1961), 261–69, and L. Kriesberg, "Careers, Organization Size, and Succession," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVIII (November, 1962), 355–59. For a comprehensive discussion of other variables related to size see T. Caplow, "Organizational Size," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, II (March, 1957), 484–505.

[4] D. M. Sills, *The Volunteers* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); W. A. Lunden, "The Tenure and Turnover of State Prison Wardens," *American Journal of Corrections*, XIX (November–December, 1957), 14–15; and A. Etzioni, "Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, IV (June, 1959), 43–67.

Since the sixteen organizations selected for study, professional baseball teams, met all the relatively stringent requirements described, a second objective of this research was to illustrate some of the potentialities of sports organizations as objects of sociological investigation.

METHODS AND FINDINGS

All data for this study were gathered by means of secondary analysis of published documents.[5] Baseball teams and, in fact, most professional sports clubs offer the research advantages of public records of team personnel and team performance. This fact, as we shall see, also has important implications for the behavior of the organization.

Two time periods, 1921–41 and 1951–58, were selected for study. It was deemed wise to skip the World War II and immediate post–World War II periods.

The structure of baseball organizations is such that ultimate responsibility for the performance of the team is almost always fixed on one position, that of field manager. At the same time, official authority is generally concentrated in this position. Therefore, it was clear that personnel changes among field managers rather than club presidents, general managers, or team captains were central to the study. The number of managerial changes for each time period or the average length of managerial tenure constituted the rate of succession for each team.

The measure of organizational effectiveness was team standing, based on the number of games won and lost at the completion of the season. This might be considered analogous in some respects to productivity in industrial organizations. Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum's study of thirty-two similar suborganizations or stations demonstrated significant correlations between their various measures of organizational effectiveness: expert assessment of station effectiveness, productivity, intragroup strain, and flexibility.[6] It would certainly be safe to say that, among baseball experts, team standing is the most widely accepted criterion of effectiveness. Financial profit is also an important criterion. It would appear that the profitability of a baseball club is highly related to its team standing. Consistent with this assumption, we found a strong positive correlation between team standing and yearly attendance.[7]

Table 1 presents the basic data of the study. The data for Periods I and II taken separately or together strongly supported the hypothesized negative correlation between rates of managerial succession and organizational effectiveness. The correlations were considerably greater in the second time period, 1951–58, than in the earlier one. Rates of succession and team standing correlated −.40 in the first period and −.60 in the second. One team that contributed to the lower correlation in the earlier period was the Philadelphia Athletics. Despite the fact that the team consistently finished in the second division between 1921 and 1941, no managerial successions took place during this period. Undoubtedly, manager Connie Mack's ownership of the club assisted his long tenure. The Athletics experienced frequent managerial succession during 1951–58 with the departure of Mack from the scene.

In contrast, the Yankees, as Table 1 suggests, contributed to the magnitude of the correlation in both time periods. Not only

[5] H. Hurkin and S. C. Thompson, *The Official Encyclopedia of Baseball* (2d rev. ed.; New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1959); H. Johnson, *Who's Who in Baseball* (New York: Buston Publishing Co., 1953); F. Menke, *The Encyclopedia of Sports* (2d rev. ed.; New York: A. S. Barnes & Co., 1960); *1958 Baseball Guide and Record Book* (St. Louis, Mo.: Sporting News, 1958); T. Spink and Son, *Baseball Register*, compiled by T. Spink and P. Rickart (St. Louis, Mo.: Sporting News, 1940–41, 1951–58).

[6] B. S. Georgopoulos and A. S. Tannenbaum, "A Study of Organizational Effectiveness," *American Sociological Review*, XXII (October, 1957), 534–40.

[7] Profitability, attendance, and effectiveness are related in part because prolonged increases in profits tend to yield increases in organizational control over the market for new talent and therefore tend to produce a more effective farm system. Interpretation of the correlation between team standing and attendance should be approached cautiously. Attendance may also be a function of variables such as the total population of the metropolitan area, its particular age and sex distribution, and, of course, the number of professional baseball teams in the community.

were they highly effective, but they also experienced few managerial changes.

The second hypothesis was tested by examining the relationship between changes from Period I to Period II in the average length of time a manager retained his position with a team and changes in the team's standing. That is, we wanted to see if teams that kept their managers for shorter periods (experienced more succession) in Period II than they had in Period I were less effective in the later period and vice versa. In fact, the average tenure for managers declined in Period II for all but two clubs. As Table 2 demonstrates, our hypothesis was again strongly supported.[8] All eight teams that increased considerably their rate of managerial succession over that of the earlier period experienced a decline in average team standing. Moreover, the two clubs that decreased their rate of succession increased their effec-

TABLE 1

MEASURES OF SUCCESSION AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR SIXTEEN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL ORGANIZATIONS OVER TWO TIME PERIODS*

TEAM	NO. OF SUCCESSIONS			AVERAGE TEAM STANDING†		
	Period I (1)	Period II (2)	Periods I and II (3)	Period I (4)	Period II (5)	Periods I and II (6)
Phillies	7	3	10	7.2	4.8	6.5
Giants	1	1	2	2.7	3.4	2.9
Cardinals	10	4	14	3.0	3.8	3.2
Braves	7	3	10	6.3	6.9	5.3
Pirates	6	3	9	3.2	6.9	4.2
Cubs	8	3	11	3.5	6.2	4.4
Dodgers	4	1	5	4.9	2.2	4.2
Reds	7	3	10	4.9	4.9	4.9
Athletics	0	4	4	4.8	6.6	5.3
Nats	6	3	9	4.2	6.8	4.9
Yankees	2	0	2	1.8	1.2	1.6
White Sox	8	2	10	5.6	2.9	4.9
Red Sox	8	2	10	6.0	3.9	5.4
Indians	6	1	7	3.9	2.6	3.6
Browns (Orioles)	9	5	14	5.6	6.8	5.9
Tigers	4	4	8	3.9	5.4	4.3

* Period I, 1921–41; Period II, 1951–58. Rank-order correlations (Kendall's tau) and one-tail p values are: cols. (1) and (4), $-.40$ ($p < .02$); cols. (2) and (5), $-.60$ ($p < .001$); and cols. (3) and (6), $-.43$ ($p < .001$).

† A numerically high team standing meant low effectiveness.

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN AVERAGE LENGTH OF MANAGERIAL TENURE AND AVERAGE TEAM STANDING FROM PERIOD I TO PERIOD II FOR FIFTEEN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL TEAMS*

CHANGE IN AVERAGE MANAGERIAL TENURE	CHANGE IN AVERAGE TEAM STANDING	
	Increased Effectiveness	Decreased Effectiveness
Tenure longer	2	0
Tenure about same†	4	1
Tenure much shorter	0	8

* $P = .0014$ by Fisher's Exact Test if the categories "Longer tenure" and "Tenure about same" are combined. One team (Reds) that did not change its average team standing was excluded.

† Defined as a decrease of 0.3 year or less.

[8] We realize some of the interpretative limitations of utilizing team averages as measures of succession. A study comparing the "effectiveness" and length of tenure of the successor and his managerial predecessor is in progress. In this investigation the object of study is the manager and not the team. Some limitations in our measure of effectiveness also should be noted. Team standing may not reflect perfectly the ability of the team, just as fielding and

tiveness. However, it was evident that those teams that had experienced frequent and infrequent succession in the original period needed to be analyzed separately. Therefore, we controlled for average length of managerial tenure in Period I (a control for average team standing in Period I also would have been desirable, but we did not have a sufficient number of cases). The hypothesis was supported when the relationship was examined separately for teams that were below and above the median with respect to rates of succession in the first period (Table 3). Moreover, it should be noted that the single deviant case in Table 3 (the St. Louis Cardinals) was the team with the *lowest managerial tenure of any team in Period I.* This low rate remained about the same in Period II, although team effectiveness declined somewhat. We might speculate that perhaps (1) the very slight alteration of the club's policy of frequent succession was not above the threshold necessary to raise the organization's effectiveness, and/or (2) the slight decrease in the club's effectiveness did not encourage the owners to alter their policy of frequent succession.

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN AVERAGE LENGTH OF MANAGERIAL TENURE AND AVERAGE TEAM STANDING FROM PERIOD I TO PERIOD II FOR FIFTEEN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL TEAMS, CONTROLLING FOR AVERAGE LENGTH OF MANAGERIAL TENURE IN PERIOD I*

CHANGE IN AVERAGE MANAGERIAL TENURE	CHANGE IN AVERAGE TEAM STANDING		ONE-TAIL p LEVEL†
	Increased Effectiveness	Decreased Effectiveness	
A. Short tenure in Period I (below median):			
Tenure longer or about same‡..	3	1	.11
Tenure much shorter.....	0	3	
B. Long tenure in Period I (above median):			
Tenure longer or about same...	3	0	.018
Tenure much shorter.....	0	5	

* One team (Reds) that did not change its average team standing was excluded.

† By Fisher's Exact Test.

‡ "About same" was defined as a decrease of 0.3 year or less.

The findings of this study may be compared with a recent laboratory investigation by Trow.[9] Using Leavitt's Common-Symbol problem and the five-position chain organizational network, Trow found no significant linear relationship between mean rate of succession and long-run organizational performance. He did find that the mean performance of the twelve teams with the lowest replacement rates was significantly superior

batting averages are not ideal measures of individual performance. E.g., a team may improve over the course of a season and because of a poor start finish only second, although it is the best team by other standards. And the bias of the official scorer has a lot to do with the players' fielding and batting averages.

[9] D. B. Trow, "Membership Succession and Team Performance," *Human Relations*, XIII, No. 3 (1960), 259–68. An immediate problem in making such a contrast is the critical difference in the objects of study. Trow applies his findings to "self-organizing" groups and points out several limitations of the experimental situation relevant to generalizing the findings. Formal organizations typically possess properties that laboratory organizations such as Trow's do not possess, such as: a formal system of authority, at least three levels of authority, and planned task differentiation. Moreover, when laboratory investigations have attempted to manipulate some of these differentiating variables, important results have been indicated. Hence, H. H. Kelley found that the existence of a hierarchy influenced communication ("Communication in Experimentally Created Hierarchies," *Human Relations*, IV, [1951], 39–56), and I. D. Steiner and W. I. Field found that the assignment of roles to persons in laboratory groups affected persons' perceptions of and reactions to one another ("Role Assignment and Interpersonal Influence," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, LX, No. 2 [1960], 239–45). Of course, there are outstanding examples of experimental studies that have attempted to establish structures which legitimately could be called formal organizations. See, e.g., W. M. Evan and M. Zelditch, Jr., "A Laboratory Study on Bureaucratic Authority," *American Sociological Review*, XXVI, No. 6 (1961), 883–93.

to the mean performance of the twelve teams with the highest rates of succession. Trow discovered that *variability* in the rate of succession was a more important factor in team performance, noting that "whatever the average rate of succession, an increase in the rate, i.e., a temporal clustering of succession, tends to bring about a decrease in the level of organizational performance." In addition, he found that ability of the successor was a major factor in organizational performance. Thus, despite considerable differences between the techniques of secondary analysis and contrived experimentation, the findings of the two studies appear to be consistent at least with respect to the second hypothesis.

SUCCESSION AND EFFECTIVENESS

It is apparent that theoretical explanations for the findings of this study may be pursued from two opposite directions; it may be assumed that either effectiveness or succession functions as the primary independent variable. Our data demonstrate only the existence of an association, not its cause. Logic or common knowledge will not permit us to decide the issue. However, there is no intrinsic reason why a particular variable, such as rate of succession, could not be *both* a cause and an effect of effectiveness. This may very well be so in this instance.

A common-sense explanation for our results might suggest that effectiveness alone is the cause. The manager is fired because the team performs badly. Not only is the simplicity of this explanation appealing, but the negative correlation between succession and effectiveness is fully consistent with it. However, if taken by itself, this approach possesses all the deficiencies properly attributed to orientations that rest only on common knowledge: they typically do not stimulate careful empirical test; they typically do not suggest additional propositions which might be worthy of examination; they typically do not fit in systematically to a comprehensive body of generalizations in the field of interest. Naturally, we prefer explanations that can meet these and other criteria described by Nagel somewhat more adequately.[10]

If we assume that effectiveness and succession influence each other by contributing to managerial role strain, it is possible to formulate an alternative explanation for the major findings, one that ties in with a growing body of theory and research. It was this assumption that originally provoked this study. Succession, because it represents a universal organizational process, and effectiveness, because all formal organizations tend to strive toward the attainment of their official objectives, are strategic concepts for studying organizations within a comparative framework. Numerous studies conducted in the laboratory as well as in the field suggest that these variables produce reciprocal effects. For example, both Gouldner's and Guest's field research as well as Trow's experiment indicate that succession influences organizational effectiveness.[11] On the other hand, Hamblin's laboratory study suggests

[10] Ernest Nagel in a recent book provides an excellent discussion of the elements of the scientific and common sense approaches. He observed that "the sciences seek to discover and to formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur, the corresponding happenings. This goal can be achieved only by distinguishing or isolating certain properties in the subject matter studied and by ascertaining the repeatable patterns of dependence in which these properties stand to one another. In consequence, when the inquiry is successful, propositions that hitherto appeared to be quite unrelated are exhibited as linked to each other in determinate ways by virtue of their place in a system of explanation" (*The Structure of Science* [New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961], p. 4).

[11] A. Gouldner, *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954); R. H. Guest, *Organizational Change* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1962); and Trow, *op. cit.* See also W. F. Whyte, "The Social Structure of the Restaurant Industry," *American Journal of Sociology*, LIV (January, 1949), 302–10; C. R. Christiansen, *Management Succession in Small and Growing Enterprises* (Boston: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1953); E. Dale, "Du Pont: Pioneer in Systematic Management," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, II (June, 1957), 26–30; O. Grusky, "Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, III (March, 1959), 463–67; and R. H. McCleery, *Policy Change in Prison Management* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1957), pp. 10–27.

that the ineffectiveness of the group contributes to high rates of succession among the leaders. When the leader could not solve a crisis problem confronting the group, he was replaced.[12] Accordingly, the relationship between rates of succession and organizational effectiveness was analyzed within the context of a conceptual scheme that focused on their interrelationships with a number of other variables: managerial (or executive) role strain, expectation of replacement, propositions discussed below are followed by a numerical reference to the relevant variables. Of course, no attempt was made to exhaust the logical possibilities in the formation of propositions.

The magnitude of managerial role strain is a general factor conditioning the nature of the relationship between succession and effectiveness.[13] By role strain is meant the extent to which role performance produces stress for the occupant of a position that



FIG. 1.—Organizational factors in team performance

style of supervision, subgroup stability, morale, clientele support, degree of discrepancy between managerial authority and responsibility, and availability of objective assessment of organizational performance.

Figure 1 presents the proposed network of interrelations of the variables. The arrows indicate the direction of influence. Key

[12] R. L. Hamblin, "Leadership and Crisis," *Sociometry*, XXI (December, 1958), 322–35.

[13] Position or office refers to a category that is located in the formal social structure of an organization. In a formal organization the category is defined in terms of its relationship with other positions that in turn are organized around the official objectives of the system. By role is meant a "set of evaluative standards applied to an incumbent of a particular position" (see N. Gross, W. S. Mason, and A. W. McEachern, *Explorations in Role Analysis* [New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958], p. 60). Role strain is viewed in the present study as a more inclusive concept than role conflict. The latter is limited to situations of strain produced by incompatible expectations. W. J. Goode defines role strain as "the felt difficulty in fulfilling role obligations." Our definition differs in that it does not require a perfect association between perceived and objective role strain ("A Theory of Role Strain," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV [August, 1960], 483–96).

cannot be fully relieved by institutionally legitimated means. Hence, this concept refers to the amount of tension with which a

person is confronted as a result of occupying a particular office in an organization. The sources of strain will vary, of course, with the nature of the organizational setting, rank of the position, experience of the person, and so on. In general, organizational effectiveness should be inversely related to strength of managerial role strain (*1* and *3*); high levels of effectiveness (of the manager's unit) should be associated with low managerial strain and low levels of effectiveness correlated with high managerial strain. Perhaps, however, some optimum level of managerial strain is associated with maximum organizational effectiveness. At the same time, again assuming all else equal, the magnitude of managerial role strain should be positively correlated with rates of succession (*3* and *4*). Low strain defines a position as desirable. If the strain is too high, the manager searches for opportunities elsewhere, or redefines previous opportunities as attractive and eventually leaves the organization. Once again a simple monotonic relationship may be an oversimplification; too little strain may indicate a lack of "challenge" to the manager and thereby also stimulate turnover.

If rates of succession in a position have been high, and expectation of replacement arises, this, in turn, should contribute to managerial role strain. All else being equal, the stronger the expectation of replacement, the greater the role strain (*2* and *3*). Organizational effectiveness should be inversely related to strength of expectation of replacement; if the organization is performing well, the manager would not normally expect to be replaced (*1* and *2*). Strength of managerial role strain should also be related to style of supervision. All else being equal, the greater the role strain, the greater the likelihood that supervision will be close (*3* and *5*).[14] There are numerous studies relating closeness of supervision, morale, and organizational effectiveness (*1* and *7; 1* and *5*).[15] Judging from Guest's study, we would expect that the greater the rate of succession in an organization, the greater would be the tendency to supervise closely (*4* and *5*). There is evidence suggesting that closeness of supervision is associated with degree of internal organizational stability (*5* and *6*).[16]

Two special sources of strain seemed pertinent to the analysis of the managerial role in baseball organizations: (1) the discrepancy between official responsibility and authority (we assumed that, in general, the greater this discrepancy, the greater the role strain [*3* and *10*]) and (2) the availability of objective assessment of managerial and team performance to the organization's clientele and higher levels of authority. We would expect that when objective assessment is available, the negative correlation between effectiveness and managerial role strain should be higher than when such objective assessment is not available (*8* and *9*). The first attribute concerns primarily the nature of the internal structure of baseball organizations, the second the relationship between the organization and its interested public.

Many of the role strains of the field manager emerge from the fact that he alone is acknowledged to be officially responsible for team performance. Therefore, it is defined as illegitimate for him to delegate ultimate responsibility for results either upward to the "Front Office" or downward to the coaches and individual players. At the same time, however, he depends, particularly over the long run, upon the front office for assistance by providing a strong farm system and advantageous trades, and, at all times, upon the quality of performance of the lower-level members of the hierarchy, the players. If they perform well, his position is secure; if they do not, it is in jeopardy.

However, although other managerial positions, such as those in business, often carry responsibility for results, what distinguishes the baseball manager is the fact that not only is he acknowledged to be responsible,

[14] Guest, *op. cit.*, chap. iii.

[15] Many of these studies are discussed in P. Blau and W. R. Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 140–64.

[16] Gouldner, *op. cit.*, and R. O. Carlson, *Executive Succession and Organizational Change* (Chicago: Midwest Administrative Center, University of Chicago, 1962).

but his superiors have objective data with which they can readily evaluate his performance. Unlike the typical business executive, for whom few clear standards of performance tend to exist, the baseball manager is exposed continually to seemingly unassailable comparative measures of effectiveness.[17] Moreover, the effects of many of the manager's daily decisions are a matter of public record. This means that every managerial decision that turns out to be an unfortunate one for the team, such as substituting in a key situation a mediocre left-hand hitting pinch batter for the team's star right-hand hitting slugger, is immediately "second-guessed" by the players, coaches, the front office, and the fans. The manager is constantly open to criticism, public and private.

The relationship between the field manager and his subordinates, upon whom he depends so heavily, is also influenced by the availability of public and objective measures of performance. Outstanding performance on the part of individual players insures their remaining with the club, and, importantly, the evaluation of this performance rests *not* with managerial subjective judgment as it does frequently in business firms, but instead is based largely on relatively objective standards of performance. Hence, the player in many respects is independent of managerial control. Where the ballplayer tends to resemble the traditional entrepreneur, the manager resembles the bureaucrat.[18] But the manager is a bureaucrat stripped of many vital bureaucratic controls. For example, the typical manager in a bureaucracy possesses power because he can limit the access of his subordinates to higher positions. However, the average ballplayer does not anticipate upward mobility in the ordinary sense within the structure of the professional baseball organization. In his case, upward career mobility applies primarily to the income and popularity rank systems; the players' major sources of reward are external to managerial control.

To a certain extent each manager develops his own inimitable way of handling players. After a while, the players feel comfortable with this style, and the younger ones in particular may feel that no successor can quite measure up to the standard (Willie Mays's reported fondness for Leo Durocher is a case in point). A managerial change inevitably upsets old patterns of behavior. New organizational policies, a different style of leadership, perhaps new players, and the addition of new coaches produce changes of great magnitude in the internal structure of the team. Members are forced

[17] See F. X. Sutton, S. E. Harris, C. Kaysen, and J. Tobin, *The American Business Creed* (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), pp. 336–38. In this study the authors point out how the *lack* of clear standards of performance can contribute to role strain. It should be pointed out that the skill of the baseball manager also is greatly affected by subjective judgments. As Sutton *et al.* point out, it often matters not that the effectiveness of the organization was in fact unrelated or only slightly related to the behavior of the manager. It is typically assumed in business, in baseball, and elsewhere, that a strong correlation exists between organizational effectiveness and the performance and ability of the manager in charge.

[18] Recently (April 1, 1962), sports columnist Frank Finch of the *Los Angeles Times* reported the difficult problem of control confronting Coach Pete Reiser of the Dodgers. Although Reiser is referred to as Howard's "father-confessor," it appears that the player refused to alter his batting stance to fit the coach's demands. "I'd like to have the authority to tell Frank to hit the way I say or else not play," the exasperated Reiser is quoted as saying, "but in baseball you just don't order people to do anything in a certain way." Of course, the fact that Howard in 1961 hit fifteen home runs and batted .296 contributed to his independence. Howard's reported point of view in this dispute parallels the individualistic spirit of the traditional entrepreneur: "I appreciate advice, and I accept it if it will help me, but Frank Howard, and nobody else, is going to help Frank Howard hit the ball on the button. When you step into the batter's box you're on your own. . . . This is a game made up of individuals." It would be a gross exaggeration to assert that Howard's attitude is universally found among ballplayers. Obviously, co-operation is common, perhaps especially among infielders who tend not to have high batting averages. Their skills are more likely to lie with the kinds of plays that require smooth co-ordination and not with the bat. For this and other related reasons, we hypothesized in another study that infielders and catchers would be more likely than outfielders and pitchers to become managers.

to adapt not only to the successor's new ways of doing things but also to the new informal coalitions that inevitably develop. The recruitment of the successor from the present staff or from outside the organization may be an important factor affecting the degree of instability created by succession.[19] Moreover, a high rate of managerial succession on a team tends to generate expectations, especially during a losing streak, that the current manager's job is in danger. This may encourage dissatisfied players to challenge the manager's authority and increase even more the felt discrepancy between his responsibility and authority. The result is greater managerial role strain.

In addition to the internal sources of tension, constant pressure on both the manager and the ordinary team members emanates from the organization's clientele. Unlike many other kinds of organizations, professional baseball teams must deal with a clientele that is both highly committed and highly informed. The strong emotional identification of the fan with "his" professional baseball or football club is often a part of the resident's identification with his local community. In some locales, such as Los Angeles, comprised of a large number of suburban subcommunities, it probably represents one of the more important integrative symbols. In the Green Bay area, the Green Bay Packers football team is referred to as a "regional religion."

Not only are the clientele strongly committed but in addition, as we suggested, they can readily and continually evaluate the effectiveness of the team since performance criteria are public knowledge.[20] In other types of organizations, the clientele cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the system with comparable precision. Consumers of an industrial corporation's products, for example, typically possess neither the propensity nor the knowledge to compare objectively the quality of the products they purchase or the "efficiency" of the corporation's employees. Accordingly, public relations and advertising men are probably able to manipulate the image of the corporation and its products much more effectively than can professional baseball teams.[21] Not even the best advertising men could have undone the damage to the Philadelphia Phillies' game attendance between 1934 and 1941 when they finished in last or next to last place every year.

Clientele support is critical because of its close relationship to morale and team effectiveness (*8* and *7; 8* and *1*); it is important in two ways. First, attendance is ostensibly highly related to profitability, and a drop in profitability produces strong pressures for managerial change. Second, high rates of attendance, by raising team morale, may contribute to team effectiveness as well as being affected by it. Our data revealed a strong correlation between effectiveness based on team standing and ranked yearly attendance. The zero-order correlations, by Kendall's tau, were as follows: for Period I, $T = .60$, $p < .0007$; for Period II, $T = .44$, $p < .009$; for Periods I and II combined, $T = .58$, $p < .001$. These data, of course, do not allow us to separate cause and effect. Mosteller's statistical study of the effects of playing "at home" and "away" upon winning World Series games found no significant differences in performance under the two conditions.[22] However, as he pointed out, outcomes of regular season games might still be influenced by this factor. He noted: (1) Baseball teams are often tailored to the home park because half the games are played there. Perhaps league champions are more skilful hitters and therefore less limited

[19] See Carlson, *op. cit.*

[20] Manager Freddie Hutchinson of the Cincinnati Reds once rather grimly described baseball as "the only sport in the world where everybody thinks he is an expert." No wonder several managers feel, as does Hutchinson, that fans are much too preoccupied with baseball statistics: "Now every club has to have a statistician, ours included. The statistician gives his figures to the newsmen and the broadcasters and now he's got everybody conscious of them."

[21] I am indebted to Professor R. J. Murphy for this observation.

[22] F. Mosteller, "The World Series Competition," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, XLVII (September, 1942), 355–80.

by the dimensions of a particular park. (2) Fatigue from excessive traveling may disadvantage the away team to a greater extent during the regular season than during the World Series. Still another possibility is that clientele support is less critical for team performance during World Series competition than during the day-in-day-out play of the regular season. The extensive publicity and assured popular interest in the World Series generates sufficient enthusiasm on the part of the player whether he is playing at home or away. We suspect that the home crowd can exercise considerable influence on player performance during a regular season game. Under these conditions, enthusiastic support from the crowd may stimulate the player to "put out" more in the same way that a responsive audience can help produce scientillating dramatic performances on the stage. The ineffective team is less likely to receive this added inducement to perform well.

To summarize briefly: Our orientation focused on a set of ten variables. Analysis of the situation of the ineffective team may be used illustratively. If a team in ineffective, clientele support and profitability decline. Accordingly, strong external pressures for managerial change are set in motion and, concomitantly, the magnitude of managerial role strain increases. A managerial change may be viewed in some quarters as attractive in that it can function to demonstrate publicly that the owners are taking concrete action to remedy an undesirable situation.[23] The public nature of team performance and the close identification of community pride with team behavior combine to establish a strong basis for clientele control over the functioning of the team. These external influences tend to increase the felt discrepancy between managerial responsibility and actual authority. Since the rewards of popularity are controlled externally, individual rather than team performance may be encouraged. Similarly, the availability of objective performance standards decreases managerial control and thereby contributes to role strain. The greater the managerial role strain, the higher the rates of succession. Moreover, the higher the rates of succession, the stronger the expectations of replacement when team performance declines. Frequent managerial change can produce important dysfunctional consequences within the team by affecting style of supervision and disturbing the informal network of interpersonal relationships. New policies and new personnel create the necessity for restructuring primary relationships. The resulting low primary-group stability produces low morale and may thereby contribute to team ineffectiveness. Declining clientele support may encourage a greater decline in team morale and performance. The consequent continued drop in profitability induces pressures for further managerial changes. Such changes, in turn, produce additional disruptive effects on the organization, and the vicious circle continues.

Our findings demonstrating a negative correlation between rates of succession and effectiveness and a positive correlation between clientele support and effectiveness constitute only two connections of the chain depicted in Figure 1. The methodological weaknesses of studies such as the present one, based wholly on official documents, should not be underestimated. Clearly, such inquiries are not adequate substitutes for

[23] Although officially the manager may be held responsible for a team's poor showing, the fact that managers frequently are hired later by other clubs would suggest that their alleged ineptness is partly a screen. It is not easy for the front office to resist public pressures even if they might feel that the decision to replace the manager is unwise. The case of Mike Higgins and the Boston Red Sox is instructive, for it is one where the owner really did not want to fire the manager but did so anyway. Yawkey, the owner, and Higgins, the manager, were the best of friends. Yet a few years back when the Red Sox were doing very poorly, Yawkey gave in to public criticism and replaced Higgins. However, he kept Higgins on in the rather vague position of "troubleshooter." When the team still did poorly under Billy Jurges, Higgins was rehired. A new manager at least provides the fans with some hope for the coming season. Professor Gerard Brandmeyer kindly provided this example.

well-designed field and laboratory investigations. Systematic research examining, for example, the nature of the relationship between morale and effectiveness in baseball teams (morale and productivity studies of industrial organizations have produced contradictory findings[24]), morale and strength of clientele support, and managerial role strain and team effectiveness, would be highly desirable.

Several years ago Herbert A. Simon pointed out that the problem of organizational effectiveness was essentially an empirical one. He observes: "What is needed is empirical research and experimentation to determine the relative desirability of alternative administrative arrangements."[25] In addition, he emphasized two canons of research design: "First, it is necessary that the objectives of the administrative organization under study be defined in concrete terms so that results, expressed in terms of these objectives, may be accurately measured. Second, it is necessary that sufficient experimental control be exercised."[26] As an approximation to these principles, this study, by means of secondary analysis of published documents, has, in effect, compared the performance of professional baseball teams operating under contrasting administrative arrangements, the conditions of frequent and relatively infrequent managerial succession.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES

[24] E.g., R. L. Kahn and N. C. Morse, "The Relationship of Productivity to Morale," *Journal of Social Issues*, VII, No. 3 (1951), 8–17; D. Katz, N. Maccoby, and N. C. Morse, *Productivity, Supervision and Morale in an Office Situation* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Social Research, 1950); D. Katz, N. Maccoby, and L. G. Floor, *Productivity, Satisfaction and Morale among Railroad Workers* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Social Research, 1951); and N. C. Morse, *Satisfactions in the White-Collar Job* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1953); H. Wilensky's paper in C. Arensberg *et al.* (eds.) *Research in Industrial Human Relations: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 25–50.

[25] *Administrative Behavior* (2d ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 42.

[26] *Ibid.*

[Footnotes]

[2] **Administrative Succession in Formal Organizations**
Oscar Grusky
Social Forces, Vol. 39, No. 2. (Dec., 1960), pp. 105-115.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-7732%28196012%2939%3A2%3C105%3AASIFO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

[3] **Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession**
Oscar Grusky
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 67, No. 3. (Nov., 1961), pp. 261-269.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28196111%2967%3A3%3C261%3ACSBAMS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

[3] **Careers, Organization Size, and Succession**
Louis Kriesberg
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 68, No. 3, Studies on Formal Organization. (Nov., 1962), pp. 355-359.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28196211%2968%3A3%3C355%3ACOSAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I

[3] **Organizational Size**
Theodore Caplow
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 4. (Mar., 1957), pp. 484-505.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28195703%291%3A4%3C484%3AOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1

LINKED CITATIONS

[4] **Authority Structure and Organizational Effectiveness**
Amitai Etzioni
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 1. (Jun., 1959), pp. 43-67.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28195906%294%3A1%3C43%3AASAOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

[6] **A Study of Organizational Effectiveness**
Basil S. Georgopoulos; Arnold S. Tannenbaum
American Sociological Review, Vol. 22, No. 5. (Oct., 1957), pp. 534-540.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28195710%2922%3A5%3C534%3AASOOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

[9] **A Laboratory Experiment on Bureaucratic Authority**
William M. Evan; Morris Zelditch, Jr.
American Sociological Review, Vol. 26, No. 6. (Dec., 1961), pp. 883-893.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-1224%28196112%2926%3A6%3C883%3AALEOBA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4

[11] **The Social Structure of the Restaurant**
William Foote Whyte
The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 54, No. 4, Industrial Sociology. (Jan., 1949), pp. 302-310.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9602%28194901%2954%3A4%3C302%3ATSSOTR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J

[11] **Du Pont: Pioneer in Systematic Management**
Ernest Dale
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1. (Jun., 1957), pp. 25-59.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28195706%292%3A1%3C25%3ADPPISM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K

[11] **Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp Officials**
Oscar Grusky
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 4. (Mar., 1959), pp. 452-472.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28195903%293%3A4%3C452%3ARCIOAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

LINKED CITATIONS

[12] **Leadership and Crises**
Robert L. Hamblin
Sociometry, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Dec., 1958), pp. 322-335.
Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038-0431%28195812%2921%3A4%3C322%3ALAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T